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THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION RECORD
A Discourse on Pleading
BY HoN. JOHN N. DENISON
OWEVER much it is neglected
and goes unnoticed the funda-
mental thing about qommon law
pleading was the issue. Whether this
was noted or formulated in the early
practice, when the system was a-form-
ing, is not of much consequence; the
important thing is that it was the fea-
ture which controlled the formation of
the system; and this is true though
mistakes in reasoning made of parts
of it a maze in which the feature itself
was lost. The notion was that the is-
sue must be one, that is, one matter
of fact or law affirmed on one side and
denied on the other the determination
of which would determine the case,
and the pleadings were for the pur-
pose of finding what that matter was.
We do not wish to discuss here the
expansion of the scope of this one is-
sue in the pleas of the general issue
nor the causes of it, but even in those
pleas the theory of one issue was kept
and even after the statute of Anne
and the similar legislation in this
country which permitted more than
one issue, the theory that every issue
should be single and complete in itself
was maintained, and it was under-
stood that it must be upon a material
point, 1. e., one the decision of which
would decide the case.
While this system was undergoing
development, equity pleading grew up,
a system based on a different theory,
its usages and customs rooted in the
idea that the defendant, in response
to the details of fact alleged against
him, should not only admit and deny
in equally minute detail, but should,
as far as he could, add all facts not
already alleged, to the end that all de-
tails be made known. It made com-
pulsory what the older plan forbade,
the statement of evidential facts;
neither, however, was following an ar-
bitrary rule but was In the logical pur-
suit of a cardinal theory.
Then came the codes of procedure.
The framers of the original, (1) the
New York code of 1848, the Field Code,
so called, met the situation wisely.
They evidently saw that the two old
systems were incompatible, that there
was much In the practice and meth-
ods of either that was undesirable and
should be discarded yet much that was
desirable, should be adopted and might
be combined in a new system, but
when they met the question of plead-
ing proper there could be no compro-
mise. It was impossible to lay the
matters in dispute before the court on
the theory that evidential facts should
be disclosed and that they should not;
that the allegations should be of the
vital, determinative matter or matters
alleged and denied or for the minutiae
which might govern the nature of the
relief; that the questions between the
parties should be those the answer to
which would decide the case or the
details of the transactions from which
the dispute arose and out of which
the court would cull that which was
vital; whether the court should seek
for a direct question the answer to
which, yes or no, would tell what, if
anything, should and could be done
and how.
They took the former alternative.
They prepared a code which provided
for the formation of issues and for
their trial; Codes of 1848 and 1849, Tit.
VIII Ch II; that they were of two
kinds, law and fact; that an issue of
law arises upon demurrer to the com-
plaint, an issue of fact upon a material
(1) Corn. on Prae. & Pldg.
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allegation in the complaint controvert-
ed by the answer, or on new matter in
the answer controverted by the reply
or upon new matter in the reply.
The New York legislature of 1849,
besides amending the original code,
appointed a commission to draft a new
one. That commission reported Dec.
31, 1849, and its report added a sec-
tion, No. 665, which defined a material
allegation as "one essential to the
claim or defense, and which could not
be stricken from the pleading without
leaving it insufficient." That section
is not in the present New York code
and I do not find that it was ever
adopted in that state, but it was tran-
scribed verbatim into the Practice Act
of California and thence to the codes
of Montana and Colorado and was
adopted in letter or substance by many
other legislatures. There can, how-
ever, be little -if any distinction be-
tween a material fact at common law
and one under this definition or under
a code without it. In all of them it
is a disputed question of fact or law
the decision of which will decide the
case.* In Colorado, whatever may be
the rule in other states, the issue the-
ory is prescribed mandatorially, Code
1921 §§78 and 66 and Chap. XII. By
§78 a material allegation is defined as
above; by Chap. XII an issue of fact
Is defined as a material allegation de-
nied, and by §66 immaterial allega-
tions are to be stricken out.
When, however, we come to actual
practice under the code, we find great
confusion. The committee of the New
York legislature regretted that before
making their report they had not had
time to prepare "a book of forms to
accompany the code." Every thought-
ful student of pleading now joins them
In that regret. Such forms would
*We say this against some of the reas-
oning in Tucker v. Parks, 7 Colo., 62-69;
but do not, of course, mean to deny the
propriety of allegations appropriate to
show a right to pArticular relief.
have given cqncrete illustrations of
the meaning and purpose of the gen-
eral expressions in the statute, would
have had something of the same ef-
fect as had the forms prepared for
English pleading under the Act of Par-
liament of 1873. Doubtless, also, the
example of preparation of forms would
have been followed in other states.
What was the result of this omis-
sion? A majority of lawyers and (per-
haps) judges, having lost the back-
ground of common law and equity, de-
prived of both compass and rudder,
some even believing that when forms
of action were abolished forms- of
pleading were too, went each at his
own will. It was a paradox, a way
without method, a system without or-
der.
It was necessary and inevitable that
there should be a struggle to ration-
alize such a practice and to escape
this state of affairs; such struggle
arose at once and still goes on. An-
other thing was inevitable: that one
jurisdiction should tend (or drift?)
toward one system and another to-
ward the other, this toward common
law, that toward equity.
In Colorado upon the adoption of
the code, the most influential member
of the nisi prius bench (*1) ignored
the sections which we have quoted,
avowedly supported one kind of plead-
ing in equity and another at law, and
very consistently, refused to strike out
allegations which, under those sec-
tions, were immaterial. He after-
wards expressed the same ideas on
the Supreme bench but they were
never established by a decision of
that court. In Peo. v. Commrs 12
Colo., 91, he seems to approve an an-
swer raising no issue nor pleading in
confession and avoidance. In Wilson
v. Hawthorne 14 Colo. 534, he suggests
the necessity of pleading a fact not
(*I) Elliott of the Second District which
included Denver.
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traversable. See also Roberts v Ar-
thur, 15 Colo., 456, 458-9.
In Wisconsin the code itself aban-
dons the theory of issues (though still
providing for their trial) by the pro-
vision (**) that "the allegation of new
matter in an answer not pleaded as a
part of a counterclaim or of new mat-
ter in a reply is to be deemed contro-
verted by the adverse party as upon
direct denial or avoidance as the case
may be."
An assumed denial creates an issue
as definitely as an express one and
the provision for such a denial is, of
course, consistent with the issue the-
ory, but an assumed avoidance, when-
ever the provision above quoted can
take effect at all, leaves the issue un-
stated, the real point in dispute un-
disclosed. Upon the issue theory,
therefore, the pleadings are in such
case a nullity.
Nebraska has a similar provision,
which applies, however, not to an-
swers but to replies only. This has
the same effect as the Wisconsin pro-
vision, but, since it postpones the as-
sumption of an avoidance one step,
and since the occasion for pleading in
avoidance after the reply rarely arises,
the effect of this feature of the Ne-
braska code, and other similar codes
will not be noticeable in their actual
operation.
Other codes grant to the court dis-
cretion in the matter of the necessity
for a reply. Georgia seems to author-
ize no reply. So of California, though
her courts say that there must be one
to a counterclaim, which leaves the
California rule in substance like Wis-
consin's.
In New York the original code re-
ported by the committee was the
same. Sec. 651. This seems illogical,
since the previous sections, as we
have seen, definitely established the
**Wis. St. 1915, §2667 Comp. St. 1922,
§8646.
issue plan, and this section permits
the issue occasionally to remain un-
discovered.
The inconvenience of this must have
appeared many times; as in Reno v.
Thompson, 97 N.Y. Supp., 744, and was
doubtless the occasion of the amend-
ment (Code §516, retained in 1925
Code §274) permitting the court to
compel a reply on proper occasion,
even when there was no counterclaim.
This power was not wholly discretion-
ary, because judgments were reversed
for failure to compel a reply on mo-
tion of defendant. Steinway v. Stein-
way, 68 Hun, 430. This results in
something not wholly unlike the Eng-
lish system, in which, after the plead-
ing, a master declares and delimits
the issues.
Now the English seem to have con-
sidered our codes, especially that of
New York, and to have observed their
great defect. We have gone on the
understanding that the purpose of
pleading was twofold, to inform the
court and the opposite party and to
discover the precise point in dispute.
Is not that our fundamental mis-
take? Are not those two purposes in-
consistent? The English let the plead-
ings state enough for information and
then, if necessary, they hunt out the
issues and state them. They avoid
the consequence of prolixity which we
incur in the attempt to give or get de-
tailed information, by prescribing sim-
ple forms of pleadings. Is not this the
solution of our difficulties?
New Members
The following have been approved
by the Membership Committee of this
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We Apologize
"The Association is indebted to Le-
roy McWhinney and Senators Quiat
and Toll for their full discussions of
recent legislation, and to the Hon. B.
C. Hilliard, who delivered one of his
inimical addresses."
Joseph C. Sampson, Esq.
Denver, Colorado.
Dear Mr. Sampson:
Some of my friends are chiding me
a bit about my unfriendly speech at
the annual meeting. One of them, to
emphasize his alleged point, clipped
and sent me an item from The Record.
I am sending it on to you just as it




Two Scots were walking down
Broadway.
One picked up a $5 bill.
The other borrowed it to go and
have his eyes tested.
Evjery Stenographic Service
P romptly Attended to at Any Time I
Reitler and Woodman I
Certified Shorthand Reporters-
NOTARIES PUBLIC
I Phone Champa 2260
Suite 315 McMann Bldg.
Denver, Colo.
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I CANON CITY, COLO. ?
An old practitioner, Mr. Augustus Pease. i
has recently died. Pis wife is desirous of
obtaining a successor in his office.
An Ideal Opening i
for a Young Attorney
For infurmation address Mrs. Augustus
Pease, 708 College Avenue,
Canon City, Colo.
ACT PROMPTLY!i i
+ -.- - - - - - - -.--.----
Ralph B. Mayo & Company
Certified Public Accountants
Established 1914
I FOSTER BUILDING DENVER. COLORADO






THE RECORD ABSTRACT COMPANY
725 Eighteenth Street
DENVER
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i TELEPHONES MAIN 1208 AND 1209
WE INVITE YOU
to become a partner in
The National Tax and Mortgage
Company
430-435 U. S. National Bank Building
DENVER
The Walker Investment Company, for 23 years es-
tablished here, is now merged with The National Tax
& Mortgage Company.
We are now prepared to build moderate priced
homes, and have available many lots in excellent lo-
cations.
The National Tax and Mortgage Company, while
less than two years old, has paid its regular 8% on Pre-
ferred and is paying $1.50 per share on its Common,
July 1, 1927.
It Will Pay You to Investigate
Prospectus filed in accordance with Securities dt in office of Secretary of State.





IT is the established policy of the ,undersigned
banks that the attorney designating a bank in
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A Foreword
This, the forty-third issue of the
RECORD, marks the opening of another
fiscal year.
From a membership of fifty in 1891,
this Association has grown to approx-
imately seven hundred active mem-
bers.
Originally formed for social pur-
poses, it has developed into an organ-
ization with over twenty standing
committees, each of which is endeav-
oring to improve judicial and legal
conditions and procedure.
Collectively, we should strive to
maintain public confidence in the Bar,
but, INDIVIDUALLY, WE MUST
MERIT THAT CONFIDENCE.
May the coming year witness fur-
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